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The aim of this contribution is to broaden the concept of musical meaning from an
abstract and emotionally neutral cognitive representation to an emotion-integrating
description that is related to the evolutionary approach to music. Starting from
the dispositional machinery for dealing with music as a temporal and sounding
phenomenon, musical emotions are considered as adaptive responses to be aroused
in human beings as the product of neural structures that are specialized for their
processing. A theoretical and empirical background is provided in order to bring together
the findings of music and emotion studies and the evolutionary approach to musical
meaning. The theoretical grounding elaborates on the transition from referential to
affective semantics, the distinction between expression and induction of emotions,
and the tension between discrete-digital and analog-continuous processing of the
sounds. The empirical background provides evidence from several findings such as
infant-directed speech, referential emotive vocalizations and separation calls in lower
mammals, the distinction between the acoustic and vehicle mode of sound perception,
and the bodily and physiological reactions to the sounds. It is argued, finally, that early
affective processing reflects the way emotions make our bodies feel, which in turn
reflects on the emotions expressed and decoded. As such there is a dynamic tension
between nature and nurture, which is reflected in the nature-nurture-nature cycle of
musical sense-making.
Keywords: induction, emotions, music and evolution, psychobiology, affective semantics, musical sense-making,
adaptation
INTRODUCTION
Music is a powerful tool for emotion induction and mood modulation by triggering ancient
evolutionary systems in the human body. The study of the emotional domain, however, is
complicated, especially with regard to music (Trainor and Schmidt, 2003; Juslin and Laukka,
2004; Scherer, 2004; Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008; Juslin and Sloboda, 2010; Coutinho and Cangelosi,
2011), due mainly to a lack of descriptive vocabulary and an encompassing theoretical framework.
According to Sander, emotion can be defined as “an event-focused, two-step, fast process consisting
of (1) relevance-based emotion elicitation mechanisms that (2) shape a multiple emotional
response (i.e., action tendency, autonomic reaction, expression, and feeling” (Sander, 2013, p. 23).
More in general, there is some consensus that emotion should be viewed as a compound of action
tendency, bodily responses, and emotional experience with cognition being considered as part
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of the experience component (Scherer, 1993). Emotion, in
this view, is a multicomponent entity consisting of subjective
experience or feeling, neurophysiological response patterns in the
central and autonomous nervous system, and motor expression
in face, voice and gestures (see Johnstone and Scherer, 2000
for an overview). These components—often referred to as the
emotional reaction triad—embrace the evaluation or appraisal
of an antecedent event and the action tendencies generated
by the emotion. As such, emotion can be considered as a
phylogenetically evolved, adaptive mechanism that facilitates the
attempt of an organism to cope with important events that affect
its well-being (Scherer, 1993). In this view, changes in one of the
components are integrated in order to mobilize all resources of an
organism and all the systems are coupled to maximize the chances
to cope with a challenging environment.
Emotions—and music-induced emotions in particular, —
are thus difficult to study adequately and this holds true
also for the idiosyncrasies of individual sense-making in
music listening. Four major areas, however, have significantly
advanced the field: (i) the development of new research methods
(continuous, real-time and direct recording of physiological
correlates of emotions), (ii) advanced techniques and methods
of neuroscience (including fMRI, PET, EEG, EMG and TMS),
(iii) theoretical advances such as the distinction between felt and
perceived emotions and acknowledgment of various induction
mechanisms, and (iv) the adoption of evolutionary accounts.
The development of new research methods, in particular, has
changed dramatically the field, with seminal contributions from
neuropsychology, neurobiology, psychobiology and affective
neuroscience. There is, however, still need of a conceptual and
theoretical framework that brings all findings together in a
coherent way.
In order to address this issue, we organize our review
of the field on three broad theoretical frameworks that are
indispensable for the topic, namely an evolutionary, embodied
and reflective one (see Figure 1). Within these frameworks,
we focus on the levels and emphasis of the processes involved
and connect the types of emotion conceptualizations involved
to these frameworks. For instance, the levels of processes are
typically divided into low-level and high-level processes, the
emphasis of the emotion ranges from recognition to experience of
emotion, and the types of emotions involved in these frameworks
are usually tightly linked to the levels and emphases. Emotion
recognition, e.g., is typically associated with utilitarian emotions,
whereas higher level and cognitively mediated reflective emotions
that are largely the product of emotion experience might be better
conceptualized by aesthetic emotions. The embodied framework
does break these dichotomies of high and low and recognition
and experience in postulating processes that are flexible, fluid
and driven through modality-specific systems that emphasize the
interaction between the events offered by the environment, the
sensory processes and the acquired competencies for reacting to
them in an appropriate fashion.
In what follows, we will start from an evolutionary
approach to musical emotions—defining them to some extent as
adaptations—, looking thereafter toward the contributions from
affective semantics and the embodied framework for explaining
musical emotions from a neuroscientific perspective. We then
move onto some psychobiological claims to end with addressing
the issue of modulation of emotions by aesthetic experience. In
doing so we will look at some conceptual challenges associated
with emotions before moving onto emotional meanings in music
with the aim to connect experience and meaning-making in
the context of emotions to the functions of emotions within an
evolutionary perspective. The latter, finally, will be challenged to
some extent.
EVOLUTIONARY CLAIMS: EMOTIONS AS
ADAPTATIONS
The neurosciences of music have received a lot of attention in
recent research. The neuroaesthetics of music, however, remains
still somewhat undeveloped as most of the experiments that
have been conducted aimed at studying the neural effects on
perceptual and cognitive skills rather than on aesthetic or
affective judgments (Brattico and Pearce, 2013). Psychology and
neuroscience, up to now, have been preoccupied mostly with the
cortico-cognitive systems of the human brains rather than with
subcortical-affective ones. Affective consciousness, as a matter
of fact, needs to be distinguished from more cognitive forms
which generate propositional thoughts about the world. These
evolutionary younger cognitive functions add an enormous
richness to human emotional life but they neglect the fact that the
“energetic” engines for affect are concentrated sub-neocortically.
Without these ancestral emotional systems of our brains, music
would probably become a less meaningful and desired experience
(Panksepp and Bernatzky, 2002; Panksepp, 2005).
In order to motivate these claims, there is need of bottom–
up evolutionary, and mainly adaptationist proposals in search of
the origins of aesthetic experiences of music, starting from the
identification of universal musical features that are observable in
all cultures of the world (Brattico et al., 2009–2010). The exquisite
sensitivity of our species to emotional sounds, e.g., may function
as an example of the survival advantage conferred to operate
within small groups and social situations where reading another
person’s emotional state is of vital importance. This is akin to
privileged processing of human faces, which is another highly
significant social signal that has been a candidate for evolutionary
selection. Processing affective sounds, further, is assumed to be a
crucial element for the affective-emotional appreciation of music,
which, in this view, can arouse basic emotional circuits at low
hierarchical levels of auditory input (Panksepp and Bernatzky,
2002).
Music has been considered from an evolutionary perspective
in several lines of research, ranging from theoretical discussions
(see Brattico et al., 2009–2010; Cross, 2009–2010; Lehman et al.,
2009–2010; Livingstone and Thompson, 2009–2010; Honing
et al., 2015), to biological (Peretz et al., 2015) and cross-cultural
(Trehub et al., 2015), and cross-species evidence (Merchant
et al., 2015). Although these various accounts have not fully
unpacked the functional role of emotions in the origins of
music, certain agreed positions have emerged. For instance,
music is conceived as a universal phenomenon with adaptive
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FIGURE 1 | Conceptual framework of emotion processes involved in music listening.
power (Wallin et al., 2000; Huron, 2003; Justus and Hutsler,
2005; McDermott and Hauser, 2005; Dissanayake, 2008; Cross,
2009–2010). Neuroscientists as LeDoux (1996) and Damasio
(1999) have argued that emotions did not evolve as conscious
feelings but as adaptive bodily responses that are controlled by the
brain. LeDoux (1989, 1996), moreover, has proposed two separate
neural pathways that mediate between sensory stimuli and
affective responses: a low road and a high road. The “low road” is
the subcortical pathway that transmits emotional stimuli directly
to the amygdala—a brain structure that regulates behavioral,
autonomic and endocrine responses—by way of connections to
the brain stem and motor centers. It bypasses higher cortical
areas which may be involved in cognition and consciousness
and triggers emotional responses (particularly fear responses)
without cognitive mediation. As such, it involves reactive activity
that is pre-attentive, very fast and automatic, with the “startle
response” as the most typical example (Witvliet and Vrana, 1996;
Błaszczyk, 2003). Such “primitive” processing has considerable
adaptive value for an organism in providing levels of elementary
forms of decision making which rely on sets of neural circuits
which do the deciding (Damasio, 1994; Lavender and Hommel,
2007). It embraces mainly physiological constants, such as the
induction or modification of arousal as well as bodily reactions
with a whole range of autonomic reactions. The “high road,” on
the contrary, passes through the amygdala to the higher cortical
areas. It allows for much more fine-grained processing of stimuli
but operates more slowly.
Primitive processing is to be found also in the processing
of emotions, which, at their most elementary level, may behave
as reflexes in their operation. Occurring with rapid onset,
through automatic appraisal and with involuntary changes in
physiological and behavioral responses (Peretz, 2001), this level is
analogous to the functioning of innate affect programs (Griffiths,
1997), which can be assigned to an inherited subcortical structure
that can instruct and control a variety of muscles and glands to
respond with unique patterns of activity that are characteristic
of a given affect (Tomkins, 1963). Defined in this way, affect
programs related to music should be connected to rapid,
automatic responses caused by sudden loud sounds (brain
stem reflex in the BRECVEMA model, see below). However, a
broader interpretation of affect programs as being embodied and
embedded in body states and their simulations would put the
majority of the emotions into this elementary level (Niedenthal,
2007). In our view, such a broadened embodied view may be
a more fruitful way of mapping out the links between the
stimuli and emotions than the rather narrow definition of affect
programs.
Musically induced emotions, considered at their lowest
level, can be conceived partly as reactive behavior that points
into the direction of automatic processing, involving a lot of
biological regulation that engages evolutionary older and less
developed structures of the brain. They may have originated as
adaptive responses to acoustic input from threatening and non-
threatening sounds (Balkwill and Thompson, 1999) which can
be considered as quasi-universal reactions to auditory stimuli in
general and by extension also to sounding music. Dealing with
music, in this view, is to be subsumed under the broader category
of “coping with the sounds” (Reybrouck, 2001, 2005). It means
also that the notion of musicality, seen exclusively as an evolved
trait that is specifically shaped by natural selection, has been
questioned to some extent, in the sense that the role of learning
and culture have been proposed as possible alternatives (Justus
and Hutsler, 2005).
From an evolutionary perspective, music has often been
viewed as a by-product of natural selection in other cognitive
domains, such as, e.g., language, auditory scene analysis, habitat
selection, emotion, and motor control (Pinker, 1997; see also
Hauser and McDermott, 2003). Music, then, should be merely
exaptive, which means that is only an evolutionary by-product of
the emergence of other capacities that have direct adaptive value.
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As such, it should have no role in the survival as a species but
should have been derived from an optimal instinctive sensitivity
for certain sound patterns, which may have arisen because it
proved adaptive for survival (Barrow, 1995). Music, in this view,
should have exploited parasitically a capacity that was originally
functional in primitive human communication [still evident in
speech, note the similarity of affective cues in speech and music
(Juslin and Laukka, 2003)] but that fell into disuse with the
emergence of finer shades of differentiation in sound pattern
that emerged with the emergence of music (Sperber, 1996). As
such, processes other than direct adaptation, such as cultural
transmission and exaptation, seem suited to complement the
study of biological and evolutionary bases of dealing with music
(Tooby and Cosmides, 1992; Justus and Hutsler, 2005, see also
below).
A purely adaptationist point of view has thus been challenged
with regard to music. In a rather narrow description, the notion
of adaptation revolves around the concepts of innate constraint
and domain specificity, calling forth also the modularity approach
to cognition (Fodor, 1983, 1985), which states that some aspects
of cognition are performed by mental modules or mechanisms
that are specific to the processing of only one kind of information.
They are largely innate, fast and unaffected by the content of other
representations, and are implemented by specific localizable
brain regions. Taken together, such qualities can be referred
to as “domain specificity,” “innate constraints,” “information
encapsulation” and “brain localization” (see Justus and Hutsler,
2005).
Several attempts have been made to apply the modular
approach to the domain of music. It has been shown, e.g.,
that the representation of pitch in terms of a tonal system
can be considered as a module with specialized regions of the
cortex (Peretz and Coltheart, 2003). Much of music processing
occurs also implicitly and automatically, suggesting some kind
of information encapsulation. It can be questioned, however,
whether the relevant cortical areas are really domain-specific
for music. The concept of modularity, moreover, has been
critized, as different facets of modularity are dissociable with
the introduction of the concept of distributivity as a possible
alternative (Dick et al., 2001). One way in which this dissociation
works is the discovery of emergent modules in the sense that
predictable regions of the cortex may become informationally
encapsulated and/or domain specific, without the outcome
having been planned by the genome (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). The
debate concerning the innateness of music processing, however,
is not conclusive. A lot of research still has to be done to address
the ways in which a domain is innately constrained (Justus and
Hutsler, 2005). Most of the efforts, up to now, have concentrated
on perception and cognition, with the importance of octave
equivalence and other simple pitch ratios, the categorization of
discrete tone categories within the octave, the role of melodic
contour, tonal hierarchies and principles of grouping and meter
as possible candidate constraints. Music, however, is not merely a
cognitive domain but calls forth experiential claims as well, with
many connections with the psychobiology and neurophysiology
of affection and emotions. Affective neuroscience has already
extended current knowledge of the emotional brain to some
extent (Davidson and Sutton, 1995; Panksepp, 1998; Sander,
2013), but a lot of work still has to be done.
Dealing with musically induced emotions, further, can be
approached from different scales of description: the larger
evolutionary scale (phylogeny) and the scale of individual human
development (ontogeny).
An abundance of empirical evidence has been gathered
from developmental (newborn studies and infant-directed
speech) (Trehub, 2003; Falk, 2009) and comparative research
between humans and non-human animals (referential emotive
vocalizations and separation calls). It has been shown, e.g., that
evolution has given emotional sound special time-forms that
arise from frequency and amplitude modulation of relatively
simple acoustic patterns (Panksepp, 2009–2010). As such, there
are means of sound communication in general which are partly
shared among living primates and other mammals (Hauser, 1999)
and which are the result of brain evolution with the appearance of
separate layers that have overgrown the older functions without
actually replacing them (Striedter, 2005, 2006). By using sound
carriers, humans seem to be able to transmit information such
as spatial location, structure of the body, sexual attractiveness,
emotional states, cohesion of the group, etc. Some of it is present
in all sound messages, but other kinds of information seem to be
restricted to specific ways of sound expression (Karpf, 2006). The
communicative accuracy of these sets of information, however,
has been rarely if at all studied except for emotion states.
This is the case even more for singing, as a primitive way
of music realization that was probably previous to any kind of
instrumental music making (Geissmann, 2000; Mithen, 2006)
and which contains different degrees of motor, emotional and
cognitive elements which are universal for us as a species.
Generalizing a little, there are special forms of human sound
expression that allow communication with other species and
reactions to sound stimuli that are similar to those of animals.
On the other hand, there seems to be a set of specific sound
features belonging exclusive to man—music features such as,
e.g., tonality and isometry—, which are strongly connected with
emotion expression but which are absent in other kinds of human
sound communication (see Gorzelañczyk and Podlipniak, 2011).
This is obvious in speech and music and even in some animal
vocalizations. The acoustic measures of speech, e.g., can be
subdivided into four categories: time-related measures (temporal
sequence of different types of sound and silence as carriers of
affective information), intensity-related measures (amount of
energy in the speech signal), measures related to fundamental
frequency (F0 base level and F0 range; relative power of
fundamental frequency and the harmonics F1, F2, etc.), and more
complicated time-frequency-energy measures (specific patterns
of resonant frequencies such as formants). Three of them are
linked to the perceptual dimensions of speech rate, loudness
and pitch, the fourth is related to the perceived timbre and
voice quality (Johnstone and Scherer, 2000). Taken together, these
measures have made it possible to measure the encoding of vocal
affect, at least for some commonly studied emotions such as
stress, anger, fear, sadness, joy, disgust, and boredom with most
consistency in the findings for arousal. The search for emotion-
specific acoustic patterns with similar arousal, however, is still
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a subject of ongoing research (Banse and Scherer, 1996; Eerola
et al., 2013).
AFFECTIVE SEMANTICS AND THE
EMBODIED FRAMEWORK
Music can be considered as a sounding and temporal
phenomenon, with the experience of time as a critical factor for
musical sense-making. Such an experiential approach depends
on perceptual bonding and continuous processing of the
sound (Reybrouck, 2014, 2015). It can be questioned, in this
regard, whether the standard self-report instruments of induced
emotions (Eerola and Vuoskoski, 2013) are tapping onto the
experiential level or whether that experiential level is inaccessible
by such methods, although it may be partially accessible by
introspection and verbalization. To address this question, a
distinction should be made between the recognition of emotions
and the emotions as felt. The former can be considered as a
“cognitive-discrete” process which is reducible to categorical
assessments of the affective qualia of sounds; the latter calls
forth a continuous experience which entails a conception of
“music-as-felt” rather than a disembodied approach to musical
meaning (Nagel et al., 2007; Schubert, 2013). Though the
distinction has received already some attention, there is still
need of a conceptual and theoretical framework that brings
together current knowledge on perceived and induced emotions
in a coherent way. Ways of handling time and experience in
music and emotion research up to now have not been neglected
(Jones, 1976; Jones and Boltz, 1989) with a significant number of
continuous rating studies (Schubert, 2001, 2004), but the study
of time has not been the real strength of this research. It can be
argued, therefore, that time is not merely an empty perception
of duration. It should be considered, on the contrary, as one of
the contributing dimensions in the study of emotions in their
dynamic form. It calls forth the role of affective semantics—a
term coined by Molino (2000)—, which aims at describing the
meaning of something not in terms of abstract and emotionally
neutral cognitive representations, but in a way that is dependent
mainly on the integration of emotions (Brown et al., 2004; Menon
and Levitin, 2005; Panksepp, 2009–2010). Musical semantics,
accordingly, is in search not only of the lexico-semantic but
also of the experiential dimension of meaning, which, in turn,
is related to the affective one. Affective semantics, as applied
to music, should be able to recognize the emotional meanings
which particular sound patterns are trying to convey. It calls
forth a continuous rather than a discrete processing of the
sounds in order to catch the expressive qualities that vary and
change in a dynamic way. Emotional expressions, in fact, are not
homogeneous over time, and many of music’s most expressive
qualities relate to structural changes over time, somewhat
analogous to the concept of prosodic contours which is found in
vocal expressions (Banse and Scherer, 1996; Scherer, 2003; Belin
et al., 2008; Hawk et al., 2009; Sauter et al., 2010; Lima et al.,
2013).
The strongest arguments for the introduction of affective
semantics in music emotion research come from the
developmental perspective (Trainor and Schmidt, 2003):
caregivers around the world sing to infants in an infant-directed
singing style—using both lullaby and playsong style—which
is probably used in order to express emotional information
and to regulate the infant’s state. This style—also known as
motherese—is distinct from other types of singing and young
infants are very responsive to it. Additional empirical grounding,
moreover, comes from primate vocalizations, which are coined
as referential emotive vocalizations (Frayer and Nicolay, 2000)
and separation calls (Newman, 2007). Embracing a body of calls
that serve a direct emotive response to some object or events in
the environment, they exhibit a dual acoustic nature in having
both a referential and emotive meaning (Briefer, 2012).
It is arguable, further, that the affective impact of music
could be traced back to similar grounds, being generated by
the modulation of sound with a close connection between
primitive emotional dynamics and the essential dynamics of
music, both of which appear to be biologically grounded as
innate release mechanisms that generate instinctual emotional
actions (Burkhardt, 2005; Panksepp, 2009–2010; Coutinho and
Cangelosi, 2011). Along with the evolved appreciation of
temporal progressions (Clynes and Walker, 1986) they can
generate, relive, and communicate emotion intensity, helping to
explain why some emotional cues are so easily rendered and
recognized through music. This can be seen in the rare cases,
where music expressing particular emotions have been exposed
to listeners from distinct cultures, at least concerning basic or
primary emotions, such as happy, sad, and angry (Balkwill and
Thompson, 1999; Fritz et al., 2009). The case seems to be more
complicated, however, with regard to secondary or aesthetic
emotions such as, e.g., spirituality and longing (Laukka et al.,
2013).
As such, there is more to music than the recognition of discrete
elements and the way they are related to each other. As important
is a description of “music-as-felt,” somewhat analogous to the
distinction which has been made between the vehicle and the
acoustic mode of sense-making (Frayer and Nicolay, 2000).
The latter refers to particular sound patterns being able to
convey emotional meanings by relying on the immediate, on-
line emotive aspect of sound perception and production and
deals with the emotive interpretation of musical sound patterns;
the vehicle mode, on the other hand, involves referential
meaning, somewhat analogous to the lexico-semantic dimension
of language, with arbitrary sound patterns as vehicles to convey
symbolic meaning. It refers to the off-line, referential form of
sound perception and production, which is a representational
mode of dealing with music that results from the influence of
human linguistic capacity on music cognition and which reduces
meaning to the perception of “disembodied elements” that are
dealt with in a propositional way.
The online form of sound perception—the acoustic mode—
is somewhat related to the Clynes’ concept of sentic modulation
(Clynes, 1977), as a general modulatory system that is involved in
conveying and perceiving the intensity of emotive expression by
means of three graded spectra of tempo modulation, amplitude
modulation, and register selection, somewhat analogous to the
well-known rules of prosody. In addition, there is also timbre
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as a separate category (Menon et al., 2002; Eerola, 2011),
which represents three major dimensions of sounds, namely the
temporal (attack time), spectral (spectral energy distribution) and
spectro-temporal (spectral flux) (Eerola et al., 2012, p. 49). The
very idea of sentic modulation has been taken up in recent studies
about emotional expression that is conveyed by non-verbal
vocal expressions. Examples are the modifications of prosody
during expressive speech and non-linguistic vocalizations such
as breathing sounds, crying, hums, grunts, laughter, shrieks, and
sighs (Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Scherer, 2003; Thompson and
Balkwill, 2006; Bryant and Barrett, 2008; Pell et al., 2009; Bryant,
2013) and non-verbal affect vocalizations (Bradley and Lang,
2000; Belin et al., 2008; Redondo et al., 2008; and Reybrouck
and Podlipniak, submitted, for an overview). Starting from the
observation that the body usually responds physically to an
emotion, it can be claimed that physiological responses act as
a trigger for appropriate actions with the motor and visceral
systems acting as typical manifestations, but other modalities
are possible as well. As such, the concept of sentic modulations
can be related to Niedenthal’s embodied approach to multimodal
processing, surpassing the muscles and the viscera in order to
focus on modality-specific systems in the brain perception, action
and introspection that are fast, refined and flexible. They can
even be reactivated without their output being observable in overt
behavior with embodiment referring both to actual bodily states
and simulations of the modality-specific systems in the brain
(Niedenthal et al., 2005; Niedenthal, 2007).
The musical-emotional experience, further, has received much
impetus from theoretical contributions and empirical research
(Eerola and Vuoskoski, 2013). Impinging upon the body and its
physiological correlates, it calls forth an embodied approach to
musical emotions which goes beyond the standard cognitivist
approach. The latter, based on appraisal, representation and
rule-based or information-processing models of cognition, offers
rather limited insights of what a musical-emotional experience
entails (Schiavio et al., 2016; see also Scherer, 2004 for a critical
discussion). Alternative embodied/enactive models of mind—
such as the “4E” model of cognition (embodied, embedded,
enactive, and extended, see Menary, 2010)—have challenged
this approach by emphasizing meaning-making as an ongoing
process of dynamic interactivity between an organism and its
environment (Barrett, 2011; Maiese, 2011; Hutto and Myin,
2013). Relying on the basic concept of “enactivism” as a cross-
disciplinary perspective on human cognition that integrates
insights from phenomenology and philosophy of mind, cognitive
neuroscience, theoretical biology, and developmental and
social psychology (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007;
Stewart et al., 2010), enactive models understand cognition as
embodied and perceptually guided activity that is constituted by
circular interactions between an organism and its environment.
Through continuous sensorimotor loops (defined by real-
time perception/action cycles), the living organism—including
the music listener/performer—enacts or brings forth his/her
own domain of meaning (Reybrouck, 2005; Thompson, 2005;
Colombetti and Thompson, 2008) without separation between
the cognitive states of the organism, its physiology, and the
environment in which it is embedded. Cognition and mind,
in this view, originate in a continuous interplay between an
organism and its environment as an evolving dynamic system
(Hurley, 1998).
Starting from the observation that the body usually responds
physically to an emotion, it can be claimed, further, that
physiological responses act as a trigger for appropriate
actions with the motor and visceral systems acting as typical
manifestations. Other modalities, however, are possible as well.,
as exemplified in Niedenthal’s embodied approach to multimodal
processing, surpassing the muscles and the viscera in order to
focus on modality-specific systems in the brain—perception,
action and introspection—that are fast, refined and flexible. They
can even be reactivated without their output being observable
in overt behavior. Embodiment, then, is referring both to actual
bodily states or simulations of the modality-specific systems in
the brain (Niedenthal et al., 2005; Niedenthal, 2007).
INDUCTION OF EMOTIONS:
PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL CLAIMS
Music may be considered as something that catches us and that
induces several reactions beyond conscious control. As such,
it calls forth a deeper affective domain to which cognition is
subservient, and which makes the brains such receptive vessels
for the emotional power of music (Panksepp and Bernatzky,
2002). The auditory system, in fact, evolved phylogenetically from
the vestibular system, which contains a substantial number of
acoustically responsive fibers (Koelsch, 2014). It is sensitive to
sounds and vibrations—especially those of loud sounds with low
frequencies or with sudden onsets—and projects to the reticular
formation and the parabrachial nucleus, which is a convergence
site for vestibular, visceral and autonomic processing. As such,
subcortical processing of sounds gives rise not only to auditory
sensations but also to muscular and autonomic responses. It has
been shown, moreover, that intense hedonic experiences of sound
and pleasurable aesthetic responses to music are reflected in the
listeners’ autonomic and central nervous systems, as evidenced
by objective measurements with polygraph, EEG, PET or fMRI
(Brattico et al., 2009–2010). Though these measures do not always
differentiate between specific emotions, they indicate that the
reward system can be heavily activated by music (Blood and
Zatorre, 2001; Salimpoor et al., 2015). But other brain structures
can be activated as well, more particularly those brain structures
that are crucially involved in emotion, such as the amygdala,
the nucleus accumbens, the hypothalamus, the hippocampus, the
insula, the cingulate cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex (Koelsch,
2014).
Emotional reactions to music, further, activate the same
cortical, subcortical and autonomic circuits, which are considered
as the essential survival circuits of biological organisms in general
(Blood and Zatorre, 2001; Trainor and Schmidt, 2003; Salimpoor
et al., 2015). The subcortical processing affects the body through
the basic mechanisms of chemical release in the blood and the
spread of neural activation. The latter, especially, invites listeners
to react bodily to music with a whole bunch of autonomic
reactions such as changes in heart rate, respiration rate, blood
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flow, skin conductance, brain activation patterns, and hormone
release (oxytocin, testosterone), all driven by the phylogenetically
older parts of the nervous system (Ellis and Thayer, 2010).
These reactions can be considered the “physiological correlates”
of listening (see Levenson, 2003, for a general review),
but the question remains whether such measures provide
sufficient detailed information to distinguish musically induced
physiological reactions from mere physiological reactions to
emotional stimuli in general (Lundqvist et al., 2009). Recent
physiological studies have shown that pieces of music that express
different emotions may actually produce distinct physiological
reactions in listeners (see Juslin and Laukka, 2004 for a critical
review). It has been shown also that performers are able to
communicate at least five emotions (happiness, anger, sadness,
fear, tenderness) with this proviso that this communication
operates in terms of broader emotional categories than the finer
distinctions which are possible within these categories (Juslin and
Laukka, 2003). Precision of communication, however, is not a
primary criterion by which listeners value music and reliability is
often compromised for the sake of other musical characteristics.
Physiological measures may thus be important, but establishing
clear-cut and consistent relationships between emotions and their
physiological correlates remains difficult, though some studies
have received some success in the case of few basic emotions
(Juslin and Laukka, 2004; Lundqvist et al., 2009).
Music thus has inductive power. It engenders physiological
responses, which are triggered by the central nervous system
and which are proportional to the way the information has been
received, analyzed and interpreted through instinctive, emotional
pathways that are ultimately concerned with maintaining an
internal environment that ensures survival (Schneck and Berger,
2010). Such dynamically equilibrated and delicately balanced
internal milieu (homeostasis), together with the physiological
processes which maintain it, relies on finely tuned control
mechanisms that keep the body operating as closely as possible
to predetermined baseline physiological quantities or reference
set-points (blood pressure, pulse rate, breathing rate, body
temperature, blood sugar level, pH, fluid balance, etc.). Sensory
stimulation of all kinds can change and disturb this equilibrium
and invite the organism to adapt these basic reference points,
mostly after persisting and continuous disturbances that act
as environmental or driving forces to which the organism
must adapt. There are, however, also short term immediate
reactions to the music as a driving force, as evidenced from
neurobiological and psychobiological research that revolves
around the central axiom of psychobiological equivalence between
percepts, experience and thought (Reybrouck, 2013). This axiom
addresses the central question whether there is some lawfulness
in the coordination between sounding stimuli and the responses
of music listeners in general. A lot of empirical support has
been collected from studies of psychophysical dimensions of music
as well as physiological reactions that have shown to be their
correlates (Peretz, 2001, 2006; Scherer and Zentner, 2001; Menon
and Levitin, 2005; van der Zwaag et al., 2011). Psychophysical
dimensions, as considered in a musical context, can be defined
as any property of sound that can be perceived independently
of musical experience, knowledge, or enculturation, such as, e.g.,
speed of pulse or tempo. A distinction should be made, however,
between the psychophysics of perception and the psychobiology of
the bodily reactions to the sounds. The psychophysics features
suggest a reliable correlation between acoustic signals and
their perceptual processing, with a special emphasis on the
study of how individual features of music contribute to its
emotional expression, embracing psychoacoustic features such
as loudness, roughness and timbre (Eerola et al., 2012). The
psychobiological claims, on the other hand, are still subject of
ongoing research. Some of them can be subsumed under the
sensations of peak experience, flow and shivers or chills (Panksepp
and Bernatzky, 2002; Grewe et al., 2007; Harrison and Loui, 2014)
as evidence for particularly strong emotional experiences with
music (Gabrielsson and Lindström, 2003; Gabrielsson, 2010).
Such intensely pleasurable experiences are straightforward to
be recorded behaviorally and have the additional advantage of
producing characteristic physiological markers including changes
in heart rate, respiration amplitude, and skin conductance (e.g.,
Blood and Zatorre, 2001; Sachs et al., 2016). They are associated
mainly with changes in the autonomic nervous system and
with metabolic activity in the cerebral regions, such as ventral
striatum, amygdala, insula, and midbrain, usually devoted to
motivation, emotion, arousal, and reward (Blood and Zatorre,
2001). Their association with subcortical structures indicates also
their possible association with ancestral behavioral patterns of the
prehistoric individual, making them relevant for the evaluation of
the evolutionary hypothesis on the origin of aesthetic experience
of music (Brattico et al., 2009–2010). Such peak experiences,
however, are rather rare and should not be taken as the main
starting point for a generic comparative perspective on musical
emotions. Some broader vitality effects, such as those exemplified
in the relations between personal feelings and the dynamics
of infant’s movements and the sympathetic responses by their
caregivers in a kind of mutual attunement (Stern, 1985, 1999;
see also Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009), as well as the creation
of tensions and expectancies may engender also some music-
specific emotional reactions. The general assumption, then,
is that musically evoked reactions emerge from “presemantic
acoustic dynamics” that evolved in ancient times, but that still
interact with the intrinsic emotional systems of our brains
(Panksepp, 1995, p. 172)
AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK OF
MUSIC EMOTIONS AND THEIR
UNDERLYING MECHANISMS
What are these presemantic acoustic dynamics? Here we should
make a distinction between the structural features of the music
which induce emotions and their underlying mechanisms. As
to the first, musical cues such as mode, followed by tempo,
register, dynamics, articulation, and timbre (Eerola et al.,
2013) seem to be important, at least in Western music.
Increases in perceived complexity, moreover, has been shown
also to evoke arousal (Balkwill and Thompson, 1999). Being
grounded in the dispositional machinery of individual music
users these features may function as universal cues for the
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FIGURE 2 | Visualization of a hybrid model of emotions as applied to music.
emotional evaluation of auditory stimuli in general. Much more
research, however, is needed in order to trace their underlying
mechanisms. A major attempt has been made already by Juslin
and Västfjäll (2008) and Liljeström et al. (2013) who present
a framework that embraces eight basic mechanisms (brain
stem reflexes, rhythmic entrainment, evaluative conditioning,
emotional contagion, visual imagery, episodic memory, musical
expectancy and aesthetic judgment—commonly referred to as
BRECVEMA). In addition to these mechanisms, an integrated
framework has been proposed also by Eerola (2017), with low-
level measurable properties being capable of producing highly
different higher-level conceptual interpretations (see Figure 2).
Its underlying machinery is best described in dimensional terms
(core affects as valence and arousal) but conscious interpretations
can be superposed on them, allowing a categorical approach
that relies on higher-level conceptual categories as well. As
such, the model can be considered a hybrid model that builds
on these existing emotion models and attempts to clarify the
levels of explanations of emotions and the typical measures
related to these layers of explanations. Although this is a
simplification of a complex process, the purpose is to emphasize
the disparate conceptual issues brought under the focus at
each different level, which is a notion put forward in the past
(e.g., Leventhal and Scherer, 1987). The types of measures of
emotions alluded to in the model are not merely alternative
instruments but profoundly different ontological stances which
capture biological reductionism (all physiological responses),
psychological (all behavioral responses including self-reports)
and phenomenological (various experiential including narratives
and metaphors) perspectives.
The dimensional perspective on emotions has fostered already
a long program of research with objectless dimensions such
as pleasure–displeasure (pleasure or valence) and activation–
deactivation (arousal or energy). Their combination—called core
affect—can be considered as a first primitive that is involved in
most psychological events and makes them “hot” or emotional.
Involving a pre-conceptual process, a neurophysiological state,
core affect is accessible to consciousness as a simple non-
reflective feeling, e.g., feeling good or bad, feeling lethargic
or energized. Perception of the affective quality is the second
primitive. It is a “cold” process which is made hot by
being combined with a change in core affect (Russell, 2003,
2009).
The dimensional approach has been challenged to some
extent. Eerola’s hybrid model (Eerola, 2017) assigns three
explanatory levels of affects, starting from low level sensed
emotions (core affect), proceeding over perceived or recognized
emotions (basic emotions), and ending with experienced and
felt emotions (high-level complex emotions). It takes as the
lowest level core affect, as a neurophysiological state which is
accessible to consciousness as a simple primitive non-reflective
feeling (Russell and Barrett, 1999). It reflects the idea that affects
arise from the core of the body and neural representations
of the body state. The next higher level organizes emotions
by conceiving of them in terms of discrete categories such
as fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and surprise (Matsumoto and
Ekman, 2009; and Sander, 2013 for a discussion of number
and label of the categories). Both levels have furthered an
abundance of theoretical and empirical research with a focus on
the development of emotion taxonomies which all offer distinct
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ways to tackle musical emotions. Both the dimensional and basic
emotions model, however, seem to overlap considerably, and
this holds true especially for artworks and objects in nature
(Eerola and Vuoskoski, 2011) which are not always explained
in terms of dimensions or discrete patterns of emotions that
are involved in everyday survival (Sander, 2013). As such,
there is also a level beyond core affects and the perception of
basic emotions which is not reducible to mere reactions to the
environment, and that encompasses complex emotions that are
more contemplative, reflected and nuanced, somewhat analogous
to other complex emotions such as moral, social and epistemic
ones (see below).
While such a hybrid model may reconcile some of the
discrepancies in the field, its main contribution is to make
us aware of how the conceptual level of emotions under
the focus lends itself to different mechanisms, emotion labels
and useful measures. The shortcoming of the model is an
impression that it offers a way to reduce complex, aesthetic
emotions into simpler basic emotions and the latter into
underlying core affects. Whilst some of such trajectories
could be traced from the lowest to highest level (i.e.,
measurement of core affects via psychophysiology, recognition
of the emotions expressed, and reflection of what kind of
experience the whole process induces in the perceiver), it
is fundamentally not a symmetrical and reversible process.
One cannot reduce the experience of longing (a complex,
aesthetic emotion) into recognition of combination of basic
emotions nor predict the exact core affects related to such
emotional experience. At best, one level may modulate the
processes taking place in the lower levels (as depicted with
the downward arrows in Figure 2). The extent of such
top–down influence has not received sufficient attention to
date, although top–down information such as extramusical
information has been demonstrated to impact music-induced
emotions (Vuoskoski and Eerola, 2015). However, such top–
down effects on perception are well known in perceptual
literature (Rahman and Sommer, 2008) and provide evidence
against strictly modular framework. Despite this shortcoming,
the hybrid model does organize the range of processes in a
functional manner.
EMOTIONS MODULATED BY
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
In what preceded we have emphasized the bottom–up approach
to musically induced emotions, taking as a starting point
that affective experience may reflect an evolutionary primitive
form of consciousness above which more complex layers of
consciousness can emerge (Panksepp, 2005). Many higher
neural systems are in fact involved in the various distinct
aspects of experiencing and recognizing musical emotions,
but a great deal of the emotional power may be generated
by lower subcortical regions where basic affective states are
organized (Panksepp, 1998; Damasio, 1999; Panksepp and
Bernatzky, 2002). This lower level processing, however, can
be modified to some extent by other variables such as
repeated encounters with the stimulus—going from mere
exposure, over habituation and sensitization—, co-occurrence
with other stimuli (classical and evaluative conditioning) and
varying internal states such as, e.g., motivation (Moors, 2007,
p. 1241).
A real aesthetic experience of music, moreover, can be defined
as an experience “in which the individual immerses herself in
the music, dedicating her attention to perceptual, cognitive, and
affective interpretation based on the formal properties of the
perceptual experience” (Brattico and Pearce, 2013, p. 49). This
means that several mechanisms may be used for the processing,
elicitation, and experience of emotions (Storbeck and Clore,
2007).
Musical sense-making, in this view, has to be broadened
from a mere cognitive to a more encompassing approach that
includes affective semantics and embodied cognition. What really
counts in this regard, is the difficult relationship between emotion
and cognition (Panksepp, 2009–2010). Cognition, regarded in a
narrow account, is contrasted mainly with emotion and cognitive
output is defined as information that is not related to emotion.
It is coined “cold” as contrasted with “hot” affective information
processing (Eder et al., 2007). Recent neuroanatomic studies,
however, seem to increasingly challenge the idea of specialized
brain structures for cognition versus emotion (Storbeck and
Clore, 2007), and there is also no easy separation between
cognitive and emotional components insofar as the functions
of these areas are concerned (Ishizu and Zeki, 2014). Some
popular ideas about cognition and emotion such as affective
independence, affective primacy and affective automaticity have
been questioned accordingly (Storbeck and Clore, 2007, pp.
1225–1226): the affective independence hypothesis states that
emotion is processed independently of cognition via a subcortical
low route; affective primacy claims precedence of affective
and evaluative processing over semantic processing, and
affective automaticity states that affective processes are triggered
automatically by affectively potent stimuli commandeering
attention. A more recent view, however, is the suggestion that
affect modifies and regulates cognitive processing rather than
being processed independently. Affect, in this view, probably
does not proceed independently of cognition, nor does it precede
cognition in time. (Storbeck and Clore, 2007, pp. 1225–1226).
As such, there is some kind of overlap between music-evoked
complex and/or “aesthetic emotions” and so-called “everyday
emotions” (Koelsch, 2014). Examples of the latter are anger,
disgust, fear, enjoyment, sadness, and surprise (see Matsumoto
and Ekman, 2009). They are mainly reducible to the basic
emotions—also called “primary,” “discrete” or “fundamental”
emotions—which have been elaborated in several taxonomies.
Examples of the former are wonder, nostalgia, transcendence
(see Zentner et al., 2008; Trost et al., 2012; Taruffi and Koelsch,
2014). They are typically elicited when people engage with
artworks (including music) and objects or scenes in nature
(Robinson, 2009; see Sander, 2013 for an overview) and can
be related to “epistemic emotions” such as interest, confusion,
surprise or awe (de Sousa, 2008) though the latter have not
yet been the focus of much research in affective neuroscience.
As explained in the hybrid model (Eerola, 2017), however,
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they tend to be rare, less stable and more reliant on the
various other factors related to meaning-generation in music
(Vuoskoski and Eerola, 2012). Related topics, such as novelty
processing, have been investigated extensively—with a key
role for the function of the amygdala—as well as the role
emotions, which are not directed at knowing, can have for
epistemic consequences. Fear, for instance, can lead to an
increase in vigilance and attention with better knowledge of the
situation in order to evaluate the possibilities for escape (Sander,
2013).
The everyday/aesthetic dichotomy, further, is related also
to the distinction between utilitarian and aesthetic emotions
(Scherer and Zentner, 2008). The latter occur in situations
that do not trigger self-interest or goal-directed action and
reflect a multiplicative function of structural features of the
music, listener features, performer features and contextual
features leading to distinct kinds of emotion such as wonder,
transcendence, entrainment, tension and awe (Zentner et al.,
2008). It is possible, however, to combine aesthetic and non-
aesthetic emotions when asked to describe retrospectively felt
and expressed musical emotions. As such, nine factors have
been described—commonly known as the Geneva Emotional
Music Scale or GEMS (see Zentner et al., 2008), namely wonder,
transcendence, tenderness, nostalgia, peacefulness, power, joy,
tension and sadness. Awe, nostalgia, and enjoyment, among
the aesthetic emotions, have attracted the most detailed
research with aesthetic awe being crucial in distinguishing
a peak aesthetic experience of music from everyday casual
listening (Gabrielsson, 2010; Brattico and Pearce, 2013, p. 51),
although studies that induce a range of emotions in laboratory
conditions may fail to arouse the special emotions such
as awe, wonder and transcendence (Vuoskoski and Eerola,
2011).
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES:
NATURE MEETS NURTURE
In this paper, we explored the evolutionary groundings of
music-induced emotions. Starting from a definition of emotions
as adaptive processes we tried to show that music-induced
emotions reflect ancient brain functions. The inductive power
of such functions, however, can be expanded or even overruled
to some extent by the evolutionary younger regions of the
brain. The issue whether an emotional modulation of sensory
input is “top–down” and dependent upon input from “higher”
areas of the brain or whether it is “bottom–up,” or both, is
up to now an unresolved question (Ishizu and Zeki, 2014).
Affect and cognition, in fact, have long been treated as
independent domains, but current evidence seems to suggest
that both are in fact highly interdependent (Storbeck and
Clore, 2007). Although we may never know with certainty
“the evolutionary and cultural transitions that led from our
acoustic-emotional sensibilities to an appreciation of music” it
may be suspected that the role of subcortical systems in the
way we are affected by music has been greatly underestimated
(Panksepp and Bernatzky, 2002, p. 151). Music establishes
affective resonances within the brain, and it is within an
understanding of the ingrained emotional processes of the
mammalian brain that the essential answers to these questions
will be found, which could imply that affective sounds are
related to primitive reactions with adaptive power and that
somehow music capitalizes on these reactive mechanisms. In
this view, early affective processing—as relevant in early infancy
and prehistory—, should reflect the way the emotions make our
bodies feel, which in turn reflects on the emotions expressed and
decoded.
Music-induced emotions, moreover, have recently received
considerable impetus from neurobiological and psychobiological
research. The full mechanisms behind the proposed induction
mechanisms, however, are not yet totally clear. Emotional
processing holds a hybrid position: it is the place where
nature meets nurture with emotive meaning relying both on
pre-programmed reactivity that is based on wired-in circuitry
for perceptual information pickup (nature) and on culturally
established mechanisms for information processing and sense-
making (nurture). It makes sense, therefore, to look for
mechanisms that underlie the inductive power of the music and
to relate them with evolutionary claims and a possible adaptive
function of music. Especially important here is the distinction
between the acoustic and the vehicle mode of listening and the
related distinction between the on-line and off-line mode of
listening. Much more research, however, is needed in order to
investigate the relationship between music-specific or aesthetic
emotions and everyday or utilitarian emotions (Scherer and
Zentner, 2008; Reybrouck and Brattico, 2015). The latter are
triggered by the need to adapt to specific situations that are of
central significance to the individual’s interests and well-being;
the former are triggered in situations that usually have no obvious
material effect on the individual’s well-being. Rather than relying
on categorical models of emotion by blurring the boundaries
between aesthetic and utilitarian emotions we should take care
to reflect also the nuanced range of emotive states, that music
can induce. As such, there should be a dynamic tension between
the “nature” and the “nurture” side of music processing, stressing
the role of the musical experience proper. Music, in fact, is a
sounding and temporal phenomenon which has inductive power.
The latter involves ongoing epistemic interactions with the
sounds, which rely on low-level sensory processing as well as on
principles of cognitive mediation. The former, obviously, refer to
the nature side, the latter to the nurture side of music processing.
Cognitive processing, however, should take into account also
the full richness of the sensory experience. What we argue for,
therefore, is the reliance on the nature side again, which ends
up, finally, in what may be called a “nature-nurture-nature cycle”
of musical sense-making, starting with low-level processing, over
cognitive mediation and revaluing the sensory experience as well
(Reybrouck, 2008).
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